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This  paper  evaluates  the  impact  of  investment  tax  credit  (ITC)  on  business  investment 
using  a  unique  policy  experiment  provided  by  the  Italian  Government’s  ITC  programme 
implemented through Law 388/2000. Like other ITC schemes, this measure reduces the cost to 
firms of acquiring capital without altering the returns from that capital. Unlike other ITC schemes, 
the  tax  credit  programme  we  focus  on  is  atypical,  as  the  bonus  envisaged  is  not  restricted  to 
profitable enterprises with tax liability. Indeed, the credit can be deducted from any outstanding 
payment due to central government (even social security contributions or tax paid by workers and  
temporarily  held  by  the  firm).  The  programme  introduced  with  Law  388  has  three  additional 
features: (i) only some regions are eligible for it, as the majority of areas in the Centre and North of 
Italy are not entitled; (ii) the amount of tax credit differs across areas of eligibility, and the amount 
of  the  tax  deduction  envisaged  decreases  with  the  level  of  local  development;  and  (iii)  the 
financing of the scheme is characterized by a time discontinuity: having been enacted in December 
2000,  the  programme  was  originally  supposed  to  stay  in  place  until  December  2006;  in  2003, 
however, owing to public finance problems the budget allocated to the initiative was drastically 
reduced.  
The role of ITC has been at the forefront of economic research for decades (see, for instance,  
Brown, 1962, and Auerbach and Summers, 1979). Following Hall and Jorgenson (1967), a number 
of papers have investigated the theory of the dynamic effects of ITC on the desired stock of capital 
(see, for instance, Abel, 1982, and Auerbach and Hassett, 1992). The main implication of this work 
is that, compared with a permanent investment tax credit, a measure known to be temporary gives 
firms a stronger incentive to invest while the credit is in effect. Empirical investigations have been 
less  uncontroversial,  however.  For  instance,  Goolsbee  (1998)  presents  evidence  that  an  ITC 
programme pushed up the prices of investment goods without sharp increases in real investment. 
Cohen and Cummis (2006) study the impact of temporary partial expensing and find that the 
measure was largely ineffective in boosting investment, while House and Shapiro (2006) show that 
the same measure had a discernable impact on capital expenditure. 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Elisa Barbieri, Simonetta Botarelli, Luigi Cannari, Massimo Omiccioli, Alessandra Staderini and two 
anonymous referees for comments and suggestions, and Raffaela Bisceglia, Antonietta Mendolia and Christine Stone for 
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This  paper  assesses  whether  the  tax  credit  programme  made  investments  possible  that 
otherwise would not have been made. This is not a simple task. The ITC is assigned on the basis of 
the firm’s demand for the bonus, conditional on being located in an eligible region. It is difficult, 
therefore, to find a suitable control group; that is, a group of firms similar to the firms that receive 
the ITC in all respects except receipt of the bonus. In particular, two selection biases might apply: 
self-selection  into  the  programme,  perhaps  by  the  most  profitable  firms,  and  non-random 
programme placement, as the programme favours disadvantaged areas.  
The  empirical  strategy  is  designed  to  tackle  the  above  selection  biases.  We  start  by 
estimating  eligibility,  that  is  the  impact  of  having  access  to  an  ITC  regime  compared  with  not 
having it (van der Klaauw, 2007). To do so, we exploit the fact that under the scheme some areas 
are not entitled and we compare both subsidized and non-subsidized firms located in eligible areas 
with  firms  located  in  non-eligible  areas.  We  find  that  compared  with  non-entitled  firms,  the 
additional  investment  triggered  by  programme  exposure  is  economically  large  and  highly 
statistically significant. This conclusion is robust to the way the comparison groups are selected 
and investment is measured. Moreover, the over-time impact of ITC follows the variations in the 
budget allocated to the programme: in 2003, when the budget is reduced, the estimated yearly 
effect slumps.   
To make sure that our estimates are not driven by non-random programme placement, we 
implement an intuitive version of the regression discontinuity design (Campbell, 1969) by focusing 
on subsidized and eligible-non-subsidized firms located in areas very similar to the non-eligible 
areas. In addition, we study alternative experimental designs that focus only on firms located in 
eligible areas: (i) we take advantage of the ban on combining the ITC with other sources of public 
money  and  select  a  comparison  group  among  the  firms  with  rejected  applications  from  an 
alternative investment incentives programme; (ii) we exploit the fact that the amounts of tax credit 
differ across eligible regions and we compare firms receiving a relatively more generous fiscal 
bonus  with  firms  receiving  less  liberal  treatment  (in  these  cases,  the  approach  amounts  to 
estimating participation, that is the impact of having received the ITC).  
All the above empirical strategies point to the same conclusion: the ITC programme has 
been effective in stimulating investment. Moreover, as we show, the investment boost attributable 
to the ITC is not driven by time substitution or counterbalanced by negative side-effects on factor 
efficiency and profitability, at least within the time window of data availability. The effectiveness 
of the programme (its capacity to trigger additional investment) might have something to do with   5 
the fact that the ITC is not limited to profitable firms with tax liabilities: as those firms are less 
likely to be credit rationed they are also more prone to undertake the same amount of investment 
even without tax credit. However, the lessons to be learnt from this programme are greater than its 
effect on investment. The major drawback of the scheme is that the amount of fiscal resources 
needed is not under control (in the Italian experience, this lack of fiscal sustainability was the 
reason why the programme was abruptly downsized).  
The paper is structured as follows. We start in Section 2 with a description of Law 388. 
Section 3 describes the data, the methodology, and the empirical findings. Section 4 offers some 
concluding comments. 
2  The Programme 
This section explains the main features of the ITC programme enacted by Law 388. We 
focus on the aspects that are most relevant to our empirical analysis (more details can be found in 
Ministero  delle  Attività  Produttive,  2002).  The  aim  of  the  programme  is  to  spur  capital 
accumulation in Italy’s lagging areas, as identified by the European Commission (see Article 87.3, 
points a) and c), of the European Treaty as amended in 1997 in Amsterdam). 
This  programme  is  atypical.  Unlike  other  ITC  schemes,  the  bonus  envisaged  is  not 
restricted to profitable enterprises with tax liability. Indeed, the credit can be deducted not only 
from  a  firm’s  corporate  tax  charges,  but  also  from  VAT  outstanding  and  social  security 
contributions. Moreover, it can be subtracted from the amounts of income tax and social security 
contributions  paid  by  workers  and  held  temporarily  by  the  firm  (in  Italy,  the  firm  acts  as 
withholding agent for these amounts on behalf of workers). In this respect, the programme is 
similar to an investment grant programme, as it provides firms with  a direct government rebate of 
a certain fraction of investment expenditures (see Auerbach and Summers, 1979).  
The programme envisages that firms investing in the South of Italy and few selected areas 
of the Centre and North are granted a tax exemption as a percentage of their annual net capital 
expenditure. Both manufacturing and service firms are eligible under the programme.2 There are 
only minor restrictions as to the categories of investment goods covered. Basically, all tangible and 
intangible capital goods are included, with the only exception of  advertising, goodwill and R&D 
expenditure, office furniture and vehicles for third-part transportation.  
                                                 
2 Agricultural firms are also eligible. However, there are none in the dataset we use to estimate the impact of 
the programme (see below).   6 
There are different areas of  ITC intensity, as percentages of tax deductions vary by region 
(see Chart 1). The ITC is equal to 65% in Calabria (which is the relatively least developed region) 
and to 50% in the remaining southern regions except Abruzzo3 (the relatively most developed 
region in the South), where it amounts to 30%. For the few selected areas of the Centre and North 
that are eligible under the programme the fiscal bonus is equal to 18% of capital expenditure.4 
The programme, which was enacted in December 2000 (see Article 8, Legge Finanziaria 388, 
December 2000), started in 2001 and was originally supposed to stay in place until December 2006; 
however, in August 2002 (see Law 178/ 2002) it became clear that the automatic character of the 
scheme was not compatible with the limits on the government’s budget. An annual ceiling on the 
overall  resources  for  the  ITC  was  therefore  imposed.  To  make  sure  that  the  amounts  granted 
remained below the ceiling, it was decided that the requests should be subject to ex-ante approval 
by the tax office. Applications for the fiscal bonus were dealt with on a first-come-first-served 
basis, within the budgetary limits. The new rules began to be followed at the end of 2002. Their 
effect  became  evident  in  2003,  when  the  budget  allocated  to  the  ITC  initiative  was  drastically 
reduced (to 650 million euros, from 1,700 million euros the year before; see Corte dei Conti, 2004). 
The timing of the programme was surrounded by considerable uncertainty. The ITC was 
launched quite abruptly at the end of 2000, and the fact that it was not expected minimized the 
scope for firms to postpone investment in order to benefit from it. This helps us to identify the true 
share  of  additional  investment  triggered  by  the  measure;  that  is,  the  share  net  of  that  due  to 
postponement.  As  regards  the  supposed  duration,  the  circumstance  that  the  programme  was 
downsized in August 2002, as explained above, reduces the potential bias deriving from firms 
bringing forward investment projects originally planned for the post-programme period, as these 
investments  accelerate  just  before  the  known  expiry  date  (Romer,  2001).  Again,  this  facilitates 
identification, as it reasonably reduces the bias due to anticipation.  
Finally,  there  is  an  important  aspect  to  the  programme  from  the  viewpoint  of  the 
evaluation exercise. The estimation results we present below are based on the assumption that 
there are no other governmental programmes correlated with the allocation of the ITC programme. 
For instance, if the firms that receive the fiscal bonus also obtain other types of financial assistance, 
then  our  comparison  will  overestimate  the  effect  of  the  programme.  A  feature  of  Law  388 
                                                 
3 With Law 178/2002, the regional intensity of ITC for these regions was changed from 50% to 42.5%. 
4 Tax deductions for large firms are less generous (respectively, 50%, 35%, 20%, and 8% in Calabria, the 
remaining southern regions except Abruzzo, Abruzzo, and the eligible northern areas). Note, however, that 
no large firms are included in the dataset we use for estimation (see below).   7 
minimizes the scope of this bias, as the ITC cannot be combined with other sources of public 
financing.5 This implies that subsidized firms are not receiving extra subsidies in addition to the 
ITC. However, firms in the comparison groups, which do not participate in the ITC programme, 
could  in principle receive the grants envisaged under another incentive programme, Law 488. 
Fortunately, we are able to identify the firms that obtain assistance under Law 488, and they are 
excluded from the comparison groups.6 
3  Data, Empirical Strategy, and Results 
3.1  Data 
To identify the firms that have received the ITC we use the official Law 388 dataset from 
the Ministry of Industry, which covers the period 2001-2004 and provides the tax identification 
number (TIN) and location of each firm. There is no information about the timing of the receipt of 
the ITC, however: firms could have received it anytime between 2001 and 2004. Since this dataset 
lacks information on investment (as well as additional covariates and firm features) we augment 
the data with financial statement information taken from the Cerved dataset. As Cerved data are 
available only for corporations, the paper concentrates on them (the Law 388 dataset includes 2,030 
corporations). A drawback of the Cerved data is that there are frequent misprints of the TIN, 
which we use to link financial statements to the Law 388 dataset. As a result, we are able to find 
uninterrupted Cerved financial statements from 1998 to 2004 for 634 firms located in eligible areas7 
that received the ITC.8 This represents the treatment group (TREAT). In the estimations below, we 
have four post-intervention years (from 2001 to 2004) and two pre-intervention years (1999 and 
2000).9  
                                                 
5 Law 178/2002 lifted the ban on combining the ITC with other incentive programmes, but only for the 
incentives envisaged under the so-called Tremonti-bis Law (Law 383/2001). This does not affect our results. 
Tremonti-bis  incentives  applies  automatically  to  all  firms,  both  eligible  and  non-eligible  under  the  ITC 
scheme, and thus its effect is differentiated away in our diff-in-diffs framework (see below). 
6 We thank Sergio Gison and Salvatore Mignano from the Italian Ministry of Economic Development for 
providing us with the information on the recipients of Law 488 assistance.  
7 Eligible areas are the regions of the South of Italy. However, a few selected areas in the Centre and North 
are also entitled to receive assistance under the programme. In our dataset we have data for 76 financed 
firms located in the Centre and North,  which are used in the experiment in Table 6, below. 
8 We select only firms with non-negative values for capital stock, assets, and sales for each year, and trim the 
sample at the 1 and 99 percentiles of the distribution of investment over capital. 
9 We also make use of 1998 data for physical capital, assets and sales.   8 
3.2  Empirical design 
Empirically, we adopt a difference-in-differences framework (see, for example, Angrist and 
Krueger, 1999; Card, 1999; and Meyer, 1995) and try to find a control group that is as comparable 
as possible with the treatment group. If we can find a group of firms similar to the firms that 
receive the ITC in all respects except for the receipt of the fiscal bonus, then we will estimate the 
equation: 
 
(1)  Yijt = a1 + a2 Xijt + a3 TREATi + a4 POSTt + a5 (TREATi * POSTt)+ εijt 
 
where Yijt  is the outcome variable, investment of firm i located in region j in year t; Xijt denotes a 
vector of firm-level and region-level characteristics; TREAT denotes a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm has received the ITC; POST is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period after 
the introduction of the programme. In this specification, the coefficient of interest will be a5, which 
picks up the impact of the ITC on the treated.  
Finding a suitable comparison group is not straightforward. The tax credit introduced with 
Law 388 is an automatic measure, as there is no discretion involved on the part of the policy-maker. 
In  the  entitled  areas,  all  the  investing  firms  requesting  the  benefit  will  receive  it  (unless,  as 
explained in Section 2, after 2003 the benefit is refused on the basis of the timing of the request and 
budget  constraints).  A  subsidized  firm  is  self-selected  and  cannot  be  compared  with  a  non-
subsidized firm without introducing the possibility of bias. Let us take a firm located in an entitled 
area that has not received the ITC. This firm has no incentive to invest notwithstanding the tax 
deduction. Thus, it self-selects out of the pool of participants, and the comparison of benefited 
firms versus non-benefited firms will be biased upwards. By the same token, a subsidized firm 
cannot be compared with a non-eligible firm, since we cannot be sure that the latter would have 
invested, and thus received the ITC, had it been located in an entitled area. In short, it is difficult to 
evaluate the effect of ITC on subsidized firms, since it is hard to disentangle the treatment effect 
from  the  self-selection  bias.  In  this  circumstances,  a  more  promising  approach  (see  van  der 
Klaauw, 2007, and Angrist and Imbens, 1991) is to compare both subsidized and non-subsidized 
firms located in eligible areas to firms located in areas not deemed eligible. In this case, differences   9 
in outcomes reflect the presence of the programme in the eligible areas. That is, they measure the 
impact of eligibility rather than participation.10  
To estimate eligibility we contrast treated firms and eligible non-participating firms (ELEG) 
with non-eligible firms (NELE). We run the following specification: 
 
(2)  Yijt = a1 + a2 Xijt + a3 TREATi + a4 ELEGi +  a5 POSTt + a6 (TREATi * POSTt) 
        + a7 (ELEGi * POSTt)+ εijt 
 
The coefficients of interest in equation (2) are a6 and a7. They measure the change in investment 
after the introduction of the ITC, in subsidized firms and in firms located in entitled areas but not 
subsidized,  compared  with  firms  located  in  non-entitled  areas.  Under  the  hypothesis  that  the 
positive selection bias for the treated is offset by the negative selection bias of the eligible non-
participating firms, the average between the two coefficients a6 and a7 will capture the effect of 
having access to the ITC. 
A key challenge is to find convincing control groups. Below, we select comparison groups 
by two different methods: propensity score and exact matching.11 As argued by Winship and Sobel 
(2004), jointly considering these methods offers a way of assessing the robustness of the estimates.  
As for the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985), we use the Nearest Neighbour 
Matching as implemented by Becker and Ichino (2002).12 Each treated firm is matched with the 
non-subsidized firm located in the same area of ITC intensity (see Section 2) and displaying the 
nearest  propensity  score.  In  addition,  it  is  matched  with  the  non-eligible  firm  displaying  the 
nearest propensity score. Both control groups are derived from the population of Italian firms with 
uninterrupted Cerved financial statements over the period 1998-2004, from which firms receiving 
some other sources of aid (Law 488 grants) are removed. The propensity score is Logit-estimated 
using  a  set  of  firm-level  covariates  averaged  over  the  pre-intervention  period  (1998-2000):  we 
include a proxy for the firm size (sales), a measure of internal funds (cash flow as a percentage of 
                                                 
10 In the programme evaluation literature there are many analogies to this exercise, such as estimating the 
economic impact of firms’ exposure to road and rail networks rather than their usage. In the study of micro-
credit, Morduch (1998) uses a framework similar to ours. 
11  Data  processing  was  performed  so  as  to  guarantee  the  anonymity  of  the  data  and  prevent  the  re-
identification of firms.   
12 Matching is executed with replacement. Results differ only a little if matching without replacement is 
allowed instead. Similarly, results obtained using alternative propensity score estimators, such as  the radius 
matching and the kernel matching, are qualitatively very similar to those presented in the text (see Dehejia 
and Wahba, 2002).    10 
assets), a measure of the interest rate (interest costs as a percentage of debt), a measure of leverage 
(debt as a percentage of assets), a proxy for gross profitability (gross operating margin, GOM, as a 
percentage of value added), and ROA. We also add a series of 3-digit industry dummies. Note, 
however, that control firms can belong to different industries from the treated firms.  
We also rely on a different selection criterion: exact matching. In this case, we first impose 
treated and control firms to be in the same industry. In particular, both eligible non-subsidized and 
non-eligible firms have to share the same 4-digit ATECO as the subsidized firm. Note that this is a 
quite  detailed  industry  level,  which  includes,  for  instance,  cotton  power-loom  weaving  and 
ceramic tile manufacture. Then, within each industry-level stratum we select two counterparts of 
each treated firm (again, one located in the same area of ITC intensity, the other in a non-eligible 
area) by minimizing a loss function that has in argument the covariates Investment/Capital, Sales, 
Cash Flow/Assets, Interest Cost/Debt, and ROA.13 The control groups selected by exact matching 
have the nice property that very detailed industry-level patterns are differentiated away. 
The  control  groups  selected  by  the  alternative  methods  of  propensity  score  and  exact 
matching are basically disjoint. Among the 1,253 firms selected by propensity score (620 eligible 
non-subsidized firms and 633 non-eligible firms), only 22  also appear in the control group selected 
by exact matching (which includes 1,264 firms, 623 and 641 respectively). This feature enhances the 
robustness  of  our  estimates,  as  we  are  contrasting  subsidized  firms  with  two  quite  different 
comparison samples. 
We gauge the effect of eligibility by estimating equation (2) and averaging the effects of the 
programme for subsidized firms and eligible firms, compared with non-eligible firms. We start by 
using the comparison groups selected by propensity score. As shown by Table A1, which reports 
descriptive statistics of the three groups as well as their mean differences, the propensity score 
ensures a good balance, as most of the mean differences in firm observables are not significant.  
Table 1 shows the results we obtain by estimating equation (2). To provide some robustness 
to the measurement of investment (see Cummis et al, 1994, and Lamont, 1997), we compute the 
dependent variable in a variety of different ways. In Panel A the dependent variable is (cumulative 
over time) investment as a percentage of the capital stock at the beginning of the period; in Panel B 
investment is normalized by pre-dated sales; finally, in Panel C it is divided by lagged assets. The 
table shows the estimates for the coefficients on the two interactions. The specifications always 
include, in addition to  the dummies TREAT, ELEG, and POST, also region fixed effects and firm-
                                                 
13 This set of  covariates is the one for the which the balancing properties are satisfied most nicely.   11 
level covariates. As for the latter, which vary by firm and (post-intervention) year, we include the 
same variables used for the propensity score.  
A major concern is that the estimates may reflect general differences across eligible and 
non-eligible areas (non-random programme placement). Since eligible areas are the regions of the 
South of Italy while non-eligible areas include regions of the Centre and North, this could be a 
serious issue. As is well known, the South of Italy differs from the Centre and North in a number 
of respects. The South is generally poorer and less endowed with infrastructures. The South also 
has a lower quality of local institutions and less property-right protection. We try to tackle this 
issue by adopting a number of empirical strategies. First, we always include region fixed effects in 
the estimates. This ensures that our findings are not driven by omitted fixed local characteristics. 
However,  there  could  be  omitted  time-varying  and  region-specific  effects  correlated  with  the 
programme that might drive the apparent effect of the ITC on eligible firms. Therefore, we also 
include a number of time-varying controls defined at the regional level. In particular, we add the 
growth  rate  of  GDP,  investment,  and  employment.  Later  on,  we  implement  a  more 
straightforward strategy to alleviate the concerns relating to non-random programme placement, 
focus  on  regions  that  can  be  deemed  similar,  and  estimate  the  effect  of  the  ITC  within  these 
regions. 
Turning  to  the  results,  we  find  that  both  the  interaction  coefficient  between  POST  and 
TREAT and that between POST and ELEG enter with a positive sign. Both terms always display 
high statistical significance, irrespective of the way the dependent variable is measured. The high 
statistical significance is also robust to how we specify the stratum of the clustering correction 
(Wooldridge, 2002).14 As explained above, the average of the two coefficients can be interpreted as 
the causal effect of programme eligibility. We can therefore gauge the magnitude of having access 
to the ITC programme as follows. Descriptive statistics show that during the post-intervention 
period, investment as a percentage of the capital of the treated, eligible non-participating and non-
eligible groups is equal to 165%, 100% and 99%, respectively. That means that the average (non 
causal) investment of the eligible firms amounts to 130%, that is about 1.3 times the investment 
carried out by non-eligible firms. Diff-in-diffs estimates in Column 1, Panel A of Table 1 suggest, 
however,  that  the  additional  investment  caused  by  programme  eligibility  is  much  reduced, 
amounting to 44% of the post-intervention investment activity of the non-eligible firms. Column 2 
                                                 
14 Since we compare differences in outcomes over two adjacent collapsed periods, the estimated standard 
errors are robust to potential serial correlation even in small samples (see Bertrand et al., 2004).   12 
shows that when the region time-varying controls are included, the estimated effect of programme 
eligibility decreases to 38%.15 Normalizing investment by sales and assets (Panel B and Panel C) 
delivers similar pictures. In these cases, the estimated impacts amount respectively to 65% and 
60% in the specification that allows for region time-varying covariates.  
We then turn to exact matching. As shown in Table A2, in this case too most of the pre-
intervention  observables  are  fairly  similar  across  groups.  Only  a  few  covariates  (for  instance, 
interest costs and gross margins) are not perfectly balanced, as their mean differences are not zero. 
Table 2 shows the results we obtain by estimating equation (2) for this sample. We find that the 
estimated effect of programme eligibility remains positive and highly significant. When evaluated 
over capital (Panel A), the additional investment prompted by the existence of the programme 
amounts  to 112% of the investment of the non-eligible firms (Column 1). It also survives the 
inclusion of the regional time-varying controls (Column 2).16 Moreover, the estimated magnitude 
of  the  effect  obtained  by  using  alternative  dependent  variables  is  in  the  same  range.  In  the 
specification  that  allows  for  region  time-varying  controls,  the  impact  is  equal  to  134%  when 
investment is measured over sales (Panel B) and to 180% when investment is normalized by assets 
(Panel C). 
The results of Table 1 and Table 2 can be used to guess-estimate the effect of the ITC on the 
population of eligible firms. In the Law 388 dataset there are 1,970 southern corporations that have 
received the fiscal bonus. They represent a very small percentage of the corporations eligible under 
the  programme.  For  instance,  in  2001  and  2002  the  Cerved  dataset  includes  59,980  southern 
corporations that have neither received the ITC nor any other form of aid (28,060 of them record 
positive investment). To have an idea of the population-average effect of the ITC, we can weight 
the  coefficient  a6  by  the  share  of  treated  firms  in  the  eligible  population  of  firms 
(1,970/(59,980+1,970)=0,03), and the coefficient a7 by its complement to unity (0,97). In this case, if 
we take, for instance, the estimates of Table 1, Panel A, Column 2, we calculate that the effect is 
equal to 9% of the investment of the non-eligible firms. We can also calculate the average effect of 
                                                 
15 For cost-benefit purposes, this increase should be considered borderline satisfactory, as the fiscal bonus 
received by the firms in our sample amounts to 30% of the pre-dated capital. 
16 These magnitudes are roughly comparable with those found in other studies (for example, House and 
Shapiro, 2006).   13 
ITC eligibility for the sub-sample of firms that record positive investment. This effect is equal to 
12% of the investment of the non-eligible counterparts. 17 
As explained above, the timing of the receipt of the ITC for a single firm is not known. A 
firm in our dataset could have received it anytime between 2001 and 2004. However, we do know 
the timing of the aggregate amounts involved. In 2003 the budget allocated to the ITC programme 
was drastically reduced. Therefore, the bulk of the financing occurred in 2001 and 2002. This is a 
piece of information that we can exploit. If the estimated investment pattern is truly driven by the 
ITC, we should observe a relatively sharper surge in investment in the two initial years of the 
programme. Operationally, we estimate the impact of the programme for each single year of the 
post-intervention period. In this case, we run the following year-by-year version of equation (2): 
 
(3)  Yijt = a1 + a2 Xijt + a3 TREATi + a4 ELEGi + Σt a5,t YEARt + Σt a6,t (TREATi * YEARPOSTt) 
         + Σt a7,t (ELEGi * YEARPOSTt)+ εijt 
 
where YEAR denotes time dummies, and YEARPOST is a series of dummies for each of the years 
after the introduction of the programme. The coefficients of interest in equation (3) are a6,t and a7,t. 
Since the impact is evaluated over time, we observe as many coefficients as the years of the post-
treatment period. They measure the yearly change in investment after the introduction of the ITC, 
in subsidized firms and firms located in entitled areas but non-subsidized, compared with firms 
located in non-entitled areas. Again, for each year the average of the two coefficients captures the 
effect of eligibility. Results are described in Table 3. They are very encouraging, as in 2001 and 2002 
the coefficient on the interaction between YEARPOST and TREAT is almost always positive and 
significant. In the two remaining years, the coefficient is either negative or positive but with a 
smaller absolute value. This finding is robust to the method we employ to select the comparison 
groups and the way we specify the dependent variable. 
The estimates of Table 3 give us a chance to discuss the role of time substitution in our 
results (Abel ,1982; Adda and Cooper, 2000; Auerbach and Hines, 1988). First, to take advantage of 
the ITC, firms may have postponed investment projects originally planned for the pre-intervention 
                                                 
17 Investing firms in eligible areas might decide not to claim the bonus (see Knittel, 2005). On the one hand, 
this  can  be  put  down  to  a  lack  of  knowledge,  as  there  are  virtually  no  costs  involved  in  the  claiming 
procedure.  All  an  entitled  firm  needs  to  do  to  get  the  bonus  is  to  complete  an  additional  line  in  an 
application form (form F24), which has to be filled out monthly anyway. On the other hand, for the firms 
that apply for the fiscal bonus the tax authorities may carry out more thorough controls against tax evasion. 
Therefore, a firm might decide not to claim for the bonus in an attempt to skip the inspections.   14 
period. As argued in Section 2, this is fairly unlikely as there was no expectation of the launch of 
the ITC programme. In any case, in this circumstance there would have been less investment by 
the treated firms compared with the comparison firms before the start of the programme. Since in 
our sample (see Tables A1 and A2) pre-treatment investment for treated firms is undistinguishable 
from that of the untreated counterparts, this cannot be the reason behind our estimates.18 Second, 
firms  may  also  have  brought  forward  investment  projects  originally  planned  for  the  post-
programme period. Again, as explained in Section 2, the bias arising from anticipating investments 
should reasonably be attenuated by the fact that the programme was abruptly downsized in 2003; 
that is, three years before the known expiry date. Indeed, standard dynamic models of investment 
behaviour predict that investments which are brought forward should boom prior to the known 
date of expiry of the law. In any case, to detect evidence of time substitution we turn to the data. In 
the anticipation scenario we should observe that the increased investment activity comes at the 
expense of future accumulation. Since the bulk of the treatment was provided in 2001 and 2002, the 
investment of the treated firms should have slowed down subsequently.19 The fact that in 2003 and  
2004 (Table 3) the investment of the treated group is most of the time lower than that of the non-
eligible  counterparts  (and  the  effects  are  also  statistically  significant)  signals  that  a  moderate 
degree of time substitution cannot be ruled out. Clearly, since the net effects over time estimated in 
Tables 1 and 2 are positive, the initial investment increase triggered by the ITC is higher than the 
subsequent decrease. Note that our data end in 2004. Therefore, to the extent that the drop in 
accumulation  might  have  occurred  after  2004,  we  would  be  unable  to  disentangle  an  inter-
temporal substitution pattern.  
A potential issue with our balanced panel of uninterrupted balance sheets is survivorship 
bias. In particular, there could be a differential loss of financial-statement availability for treated 
and untreated firms (see Olley and Pakes, 1996). Suppose that the effect of the ITC is to keep alive 
a marginal firm. In this scenario, marginal firms in the control groups go out of business because 
they remain unsubsidized. Therefore, the estimates from the balanced panel could be negatively 
biased  because  the  marginal  unsubsidized  firms,  which  are  likely  to  display  the  lowest 
accumulation rates, are no longer included in the comparison groups. To tackle this problem we 
                                                 
18 Moreover, we find  similar results in an additional experiment (see below) in which we impose treatment 
and control groups to be comparable for a long time series of pre-treatment investment growth rates. 
19 According the estimates provided in Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) for the other main Italian investment 
incentives programme (Law 488), the timing of the slowdown is approximately from one to two years after 
the end of the programme.   15 
construct  an  unbalanced  panel,  for  the  which  we  do  not  require  the  financial  accounts  to  be 
available over the entire period. We start by picking treated firms that have a minimum of two pre-
intervention and two post-intervention adjacent sets of financial-statement data.20 We are able to 
find 993 such firms, compared with the 634 firms in the balanced panel. Then, firms in the control 
groups are selected by the exact matching procedure explained above, in which, however, control 
firms are also required to share the same years of balance-sheet availability as the treated firms. To 
the extent that unsubsidized firms go out of business after a first stage of the post-intervention 
period, the unbalanced panel would include such firms (see Table A3 for the comparison between 
firms belonging to the different samples). Since the results with the unbalanced panel, shown in 
Table 4, are very close to the previous findings, we are keen to conclude that survivorship bias is 
not relevant. 
As highlighted by Blundell et al (2004), systematic pre-treatment differences in the level of 
the dependent variable across comparison groups are a lesser concern, since they can be controlled 
for by difference-in-differences methods. However, failure of the parallel trend assumption would 
invalidate our estimates. To provide some robustness in this respect, we also run an additional 
experiment in which treated and controls are also selected on the basis that they share the same 
growth rate of investment over a long pre-intervention period (we take 1996-2000). In this case, the 
comparison groups mirror the time-series pattern of investment of the treated group before the 
programme took place. Results from this experiment (Table 5 ) are also similar to those presented 
up to now (Table A4 provides the sample statistics) . 
3.3  Alternative experimental designs for non-random programme placement 
So far, we have tackled the non-random programme placement issue using region fixed 
effects and region time-varying controls. Clearly, even with these controls one cannot be sure that 
all the possible omitted determinants of investment are differentiated away. Eligible areas are the 
regions of the South of Italy (see Chart 1). An unobserved shock in the southern regions of the 
country between the pre-and the post-ITC periods might drive the apparent effect of the ITC. 
Below,  we  adopt  three  straightforward  strategies  to  alleviate  this  concern.  First,  the  impact  of 
programme eligibility is estimated for the few selected areas of the Centre and North of Italy 
covered by the programme (jointly with the southern region most similar to the northern ones). 
                                                 
20 This is required because investment is measured as the difference in capital stock between period t and 
period t-1.   16 
For this sample, southern unobserved trends are reasonably absent or at least drastically reduced. 
Second,  we  try  to  approximate  a  control  group  of  southern  eligible  firms  for  which  the  self-
selection  problem  is  arguably  diminished,  using  rejected  applicants  from  another  investment 
incentives programme. Third, we exploit the fact that the intensity of the treatment differs across 
eligible regions. Note that in these last two cases, a possible unobserved shock in the South is 
differentiated away, as we estimate within southern regions. Moreover, in these two experiments 
our approach amounts to directly estimating the effect due to participation rather than the effect 
due to eligibility. 
First, we focus on subsidized and eligible non-subsidized firms that are located in areas 
very similar to that of the non-eligible firms. To be sure, we compare firms for which the non-
random programme placement issue is minimized, as they belong to areas that share the same 
degree  of  economic  and  social  development.  For  this  experiment  we  run  the  specification  of 
equation (2) where the TREAT group includes the few (76) subsidized firms located in the Centre 
and North of Italy21 and in the most advanced southern region (Abruzzo).22 Correspondingly, the 
ELEG group includes (76) firms similar to the treated ones located in the same areas,23 while the 
non-eligible firms include (75) firms located in the areas of the Centre and North that are different 
from  those  few  areas  deemed  eligible.  This  experiment  represents  an  intuitive  version  of  the 
regression  discontinuity  design  (Campbell,  1969),  as  firms  with  very  close  characteristics  as 
regards their local area are differently exposed to treatment. Table 6 describes the results and Table 
A5  presents the sample statistics. Overall, our previous findings remain confirmed: the estimated 
impact of programme eligibility is positive and highly significant, irrespective of how investment 
is measured  
The impact of participation in the ITC programme, rather than that of eligibility, could be 
estimated if we were able to find a suitable control group. This group should include firms similar 
to those receiving the ITC. To be sure, the similarity should hold for the firms’ propensity to invest: 
comparison  firms  should  display  before  the  treatment  the  same  willingness  to  invest  as  ITC-
recipient firms. As argued above, because of the automatic award scheme envisaged for the fiscal 
credit, this comparison group is apparently not available. We try to approximate this comparison 
                                                 
21 The possibility of including firms located in selected areas of the Centre and North of Italy in the ITC 
programme is envisaged under the Article 87.3.c of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.   
22 This is also formally recognized at the EU level. For instance, while southern regions currently still belong 
to the areas designated as Objective 1 (regions suffering from general underdevelopment) for the purpose of 
EU Structural Funds, Abruzzo lost its Objective 1 status in 1996. 
23 This was accomplished by exact matching.   17 
group by turning to another programme of investment incentives, Law 488. In contrast with Law 
388, this scheme allows firms willing to invest to receive a grant. Crucially, under this programme 
the award scheme is not automatic. Instead, grants are assigned through competitive auctions 
according to predetermined criteria, such as  the proportion of firms’ equity invested in the project, 
the number of jobs involved and the proportion of assistance sought. Two features of these scheme 
are particularly useful for our purposes. First, this scheme is not available for ITC recipients, as a 
firm  cannot  combine  the  two  sources  of  aid.24  Second,  for  this  programme  we  have  natural 
candidates for the comparison group: rejected firms (see Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006). 
The  two  programmes  are  not  immediately  comparable  as  Law  488  covers  only 
manufacturing  and  construction  firms  and  the  respective  areas  of  eligibility  of  the  two 
programmes do not overlap completely. This requires some adjustments to the treatment group. 
Among the ITC-recipients we select only those that in principle  could have applied for either 
programme (basically, manufacturing firms in Law 488 eligible areas). We end up with 354 treated 
firms. As for the untreated group, we take the rejected applicants for Law 488 grants after 2000. 
Note that in principle a rejected applicant might resort to ITC in the years after  the application for 
Law 488 funding was rejected. Alternatively, it can re-apply for the grants. In both cases, since we 
are  able  to  identify  these  firms,  they  are  excluded  from  the  pool  of  rejected  applicants.  By 
implementing these restrictions, we select a comparison group of 354 firms by exact matching. As 
shown in Table A6, balancing properties are less convincing than previous cases. Some of the 
differences in observables between the two groups are not zero.25 For instance, Law 488 rejected 
applicants record higher pre-treatment investment and interest costs and lower debt. With these 
caveats, we show in Table 7 the estimated interaction coefficients for the specification of equation 
(1). We find that the investment of the ITC recipients outperforms that of the Law 488 rejected 
applicants and that the effects are statistically significant.  
Finally, we exploit the fact that Law 388 envisages different amounts of ITC for different 
regions of eligibility (see Section 2). If the ITC stimulates additional investment, then we should 
find that the higher the intensity of the treatment, the greater the impact. For this experiment we 
focus only on southern firms, both subsidized and eligible non-subsidized (the estimation sample 
                                                 
24 The ban on  combining Law 388 and Law 488 is already binding at the time of the application for Law 488 
grants. Firms applying for the latter grants  have to give up to other sources of public subsidies. Similarly, 
firms that request the ITC cannot apply for the grants. 
25 In contrast to previous experiments, in this case the pool of candidates for the control sample is much more 
limited.   18 
includes the TREAT and ELEG groups described in Table A2). Treated firms can be split into three 
groups according to the regional intensity of the ITC. The HIGH group includes (38) firms located 
in Calabria, entitled to receive an ITC amounting to 65% of the investment outlay. The LOW group 
includes (27) firms located in Abruzzo, which are entitled to receive an ITC of 30%. The omitted 
group comprises firms located in the remaining southern regions, for the which the envisaged ITC 
is equal to 50%. Accordingly, eligible non-subsidized firms are those located in the same area as 
their  financed  counterparts.  The  equation  we  estimate  is  a  straightforward  differences-in-
differences-in-differences specification, in equation (4) below: 
 
(4)   Yijt = a1 + a2 Xijt + a3 TREATi + a4 HIGHj +  a5 LOWj + a6POSTt  
+ a7(TREATi * HIGHj) + a8 (TREATi * LOWj)+ a9 (TREATi * POSTt) 
+ a10 (HIGHj * POSTt)+ a11 (LOWj * POSTt) 
+ a12 (TREATi * HIGHj * POSTt) + a13 (TREATi* LOWj * POSTt) + εijt 
 
The  coefficients  of  interest  in  equation  (4)  are  the  coefficients  on  the  triple  interaction  terms, 
TREAT * HIGH * POST and TREAT * LOW * POST. These coefficients measure the change between 
pre- and post- introduction of the programme in subsidized firms versus firms located in entitled 
areas but non-subsidized in high and low ITC intensity regions, compared with firms in medium 
ITC intensity regions. 
Table 8 shows the results. The evidence is again in favour of the effectiveness of the ITC. 
We find that the interaction coefficients display the expected sign, as  TREAT* LOW * POST enters  
negatively,  while  TREAT  *  HIGH  *  POST  display  a  positive  sign.  Given  the  small  number  of 
observations in the three groups, however, some interaction coefficients are imprecisely measured. 
3.4  Side-effects 
Beyond its effect on investment, the ITC could have indirect effects on firm performance. 
For instance, Alesina et al. (2001) argue that subsidies may foster a culture of rent-seeking , and 
this in turn jeopardizes future efficiency. In addition, since the fiscal bonus subsidizes capital it 
may cause allocative inefficiencies by encouraging a non-optimal mix of factors. Finally, the degree 
of credit rationing may vary as a result of the programme (see Albareto et al., 2007). The ITC is a 
source of financing alternative to debt. However, to the extent that the bonus activates investment 
in excess of the subsidy and the extra investment is financed through borrowing, firms’ debt may   19 
also increase. Furthermore, changes in borrowing may bring about modifications in the interest 
rate paid by the firm. For instance, if the credit supply curve is negatively sloped, increases in debt 
should go hand in hand with a reduction in the cost of borrowing.  
To make a first attempt at tackling these issues, in Table 9 we present results in which we 
apply  the  regression  frameworks  described  above  and  use  a  variety  of  financial  statement 
indicators as dependent variables. In these experiments the dummy POST takes on the value of 1 
for the years 2003 and 2004. As most of the treatment occurred in 2001 and 2002, this basically 
amounts to studying the effect of the ITC on firm performance from one to two years after the 
intervention. Regarding profitability (Panel A), we find that the return on assets for treated firms 
does  not  differ  significantly  from  that  of  their  non-eligible  counterparts.  At  the  same  time, 
profitability decreases significantly for eligible non-subsidized firms. Our results also suggest that 
factor inefficiency (Panel B) is a concern of second order. Indeed, labour cost over value added 
decreases for treated firms, indicating that a factor mix biased toward capital could have been the 
result of the ITC. Yet, the negative effect is not statistically significant. As for the debt dynamics 
(Panel C), we find that the ratio of debt over assets for subsidized firms decreases more than that 
for  eligible  non-subsidized  counterparts.  This  supports  the  view  that  ITC  substitutes  external 
borrowing. Finally, we also find that the cost of borrowing (Panel D) increases. Our findings on 
debt and interest rate patterns support the identification assumption of the paper. As argued by 
Banerjee and Duflo (2004), if the degree of credit rationing or the interest rate decrease as a result 
of the availability of the fiscal credit, then our estimates will erroneously attribute the variation in 
investment allowed by the higher availability (or lower cost) of external financing to the effects of 
the programme. Again, note that our window of data availability extends only to 2004 financial 
statements. Thus, side-effects of the programme that materialize after that date are not captured. 
4  Conclusions 
This  paper  examines  the  effect  on  investment  expenditure  of  the  tax  credit  enacted  by 
Italy’s Law 388. The programme envisages that the ITC is assigned automatically on the basis of 
the firm’s demand for the fiscal bonus. This implies that subsidized firms are self-selected and 
cannot be meaningfully compared with firms that do not request the ITC. To assess whether the 
programme  made  investment  possible  that  otherwise  would  not  have  been  made,  the  paper 
exploits a number of discontinuities of the scheme envisaged by the law. For instance, the fact that 
some areas in the Centre and North of Italy are not entitled allows us to estimate the impact of   20 
programme eligibility by comparing both subsidized and non-subsidized firms located in eligible 
areas to firms located in non-eligible areas. Likewise, the fact that the amounts of tax credit differ 
across  eligible  regions  entitles  us  to  compare  firms  receiving  a  relatively  more  generous  fiscal 
bonus with firms receiving less liberal treatment. Our results suggest that the programme has been 
effective in stimulating investment. This conclusion is robust to a variety of tests. Moreover, we fail 
to find evidence that the investment boost attributable to the ITC is due to time substitution or 
counterbalanced by negative side-effects on factor efficiency and profitability. 
Two  remarks  are  in  order,  however.  First,  the  ITC  implemented  by  Law  388  differs 
substantially for the other ITC programmes implemented elsewhere in the world, mainly because 
it is not limited to profitable enterprises with tax liabilities. To be sure, the programme is similar to 
an investment grant programme, as it provides firms with a direct government rebate of a certain 
fraction of investment expenditure. The fact that the ITC programme is not biased in favour of the 
most profitable firms, which most likely would have invested more even without subsidies, might 
be a reason for its effectiveness. 
Second, the scheme implemented by Law 388 has the obvious drawback that the amount of 
budget  resources  needed  is  not  under  control.  This  is  particularly  relevant  for  countries  with 
public finance problems. The experience of Italy in this respect is highly relevant, as a ceiling was 
imposed and the funding was downsized after two years of implementation. This represents a key 
warning for the development agencies that are considering putting  similar incentive programmes 
into action.   21 
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Table 1 
EFFECT OF PROGRAMME ELIGIBILITY ON INVESTMENT 
COMPARISON GROUPS SELECTED BY PROPENSITY SCORE 
     
  (1)  (2) 
     
  Panel A. Dependent variable: I/K 
POST × TREAT  0.7294  0.6704 
  (0.0135)***  (0.0660)** 
  [0.0141]***  [0.0442] 
POST × ELEG  0.1578  0.0816 
  (0.0099)***  (0.0578)*** 
  [0.0116]***  [0.0403]* 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: I/S 
POST × TREAT  0.0721  0.0689 
  (0.0011)***  (0.0039)*** 
  [0.0015]***  [0.0029]*** 
POST × ELEG  0.0104  0.0058 
  (0.0011)**  (0.0056) 
  [0.0014]***  [0.0038] 
  Panel C. Dependent variable: I/A 
POST × TREAT  0.0826  0.0832 
  (0.0017)***  (0.0086)** 
  (0.0018)***  [0.0056]*** 
POST × ELEG  0.0156  0.0156 
  (0.0017)**  (0.0085) 
  (0.0015)***  [0.0059]** 
Region time-varying controls  NO  YES 
Notes: All specifications include a dummy for TREAT, a dummy for ELEG, a dummy for POST, region fixed effects and firm time-
varying  controls.  Robust  standard  errors  clustered  on  treatment  (eligibility,  control)  status  are  in  parenthesis  below  coefficient 
estimates, and robust standard errors cluster on treatment (eligibility, control) status-post interactions are in square brackets below 
coefficient estimates. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. The treated sample includes 634 firms. The eligible 
sample  includes  620  firms  selected  by  propensity  score  (nearest  neighbour  matching).  The  non-eligible  sample  includes  633  firms 
selected by propensity score (nearest neighbour matching). See Table A.1 and equation (2) for further details. 
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Table 2 
EFFECT OF PROGRAMME ELIGIBILITY ON INVESTMENT 
COMPARISON GROUPS SELECTED BY EXACT MATCHING 
     
  (1)  (2) 
     
  Panel A. Dependent variable: I/K 
POST × TREAT  1.0557  1.0394 
  (0.0111)***  (0.0372)*** 
  [0.0098]***  [0.0294]*** 
POST × ELEG  0.3568  0.3454 
  (0.0105)***  (0.0273)** 
  [0.0083]***  [0.0231]*** 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: I/S 
POST × TREAT  0.0874  0.0838 
  (0.0012)***  (0.0036)** 
  [0.0009]***  [0.0026]*** 
POST × ELEG  0.0142  0.0100 
  (0.0007)**  (0.0060) 
  [0.0011]***  [0.0044]* 
  Panel C. Dependent variable: I/A 
POST × TREAT  0.1259  0.1216 
  (0.0013)***  (0.0011)*** 
  [0.0011]***  [0.0018]*** 
POST × ELEG  0.0356  0.0298 
  (0.0015)**  (0.0032)** 
  [0.0015]***  [0.0038]*** 
Region time-varying controls  NO  YES 
Notes: All specifications include a dummy for TREAT, a dummy for ELEG, a dummy for POST, region fixed-effects and firm time-
varying  controls.  Robust  standard  errors  clustered  on  treatment  (eligibility,  control)  status  are  in  parenthesis  below  coefficient 
estimates, and robust standard errors cluster on treatment (eligibility, control) status-post interactions are in square brackets below 
coefficient estimates. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. The treated sample includes 634 firms. The eligible 
sample includes 623 firms selected by exact matching. The non-eligible sample includes 641 firms selected by exact matching. See Table 
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Table 3 
YEAR-BY-YEAR EFFECTS OF PROGRAMME ELIGIBILITY ON INVESTMENT 
COMPARISON GROUPS SELECTED BY PROPENSITY SCORE AND EXACT MATCHING 
  PROPENSITY SCORE    EXACT MATCHING 
  2001  2002  2003  2004    2001  2002  2003  2004 
   
  Panel A. Dependent variable: I/K 
POST × TREAT  0.8672  0.0503  -0.1565  -0.0291    1.0497  0.0078  -0.0615  -0.0735 
  (0.0304)***  (0.0304)  (0.0304)**  (0.0304)    (0.0140)***  (0.0140)  (0.0140)**  (0.0140)** 
  [0.0213]***  [0.0213]*  [0.0213]**  [0.0213]    [0.0118]***  [0.0118]  [0.0118]**  [0.0118]** 
POST × ELEG  0.0807  0.0565  0.0408  0.0131    0.0722  -0.0014  0.0499  0.1604 
  (0.0291)  (0.0291)  (0.0291)  (0.0291)    (0.0126)**  (0.0126)  (0.0126)*  (0.0126)** 
  [0.0212]**  [0.0212]*  [0.0212]  [0.0212]    [0.0099]***  [0.0099]  [0.0099]**  [0.0099]*** 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: I/S 
POST × TREAT  0.0640  0.0064  -0.0103  -0.0100    0.0529  0.0013  0.0067  -0.00004 
  0.0008***  0.0008**  0.0008***  0.0008***    (0.0019)***  (0.0019)  (0.0019)*  (0.0019) 
  0.0007***  0.0007***  0.0007***  0.0007***    [0.0012]***  [0.0012]  [0.0012]**  [0.0012] 
POST × ELEG  0.0025  -0.0086  -0.0117  0.007    -0.0021  -0.0200  0.0002  0.0156 
  0.0007*  0.0007***  0.0007***  0.0007**    (0.0026)  (0.0026)**  (0.0026)  (0.0026)** 
  0.0006**  0.0006***  0.0006***  0.0006***    [0.0017]  [0.0017]***  [0.0017]  [0.0017]*** 
  Panel C. Dependent variable: I/A 
POST × TREAT  0.0697  0.0148  -0.0122  -0.0074    0.0681  0.0272  0.0060  -0.0030 
  0.0039***  0.0039*  0.0039*  0.0039***    (0.0010)***  (0.0010)***  (0.0010)**  (0.0010)* 
  0.0027***  0.0027***  0.0027***  0.0027**    [0.0008]***  [0.0008]***  [0.0008]***  [0.0008]** 
POST × ELEG  0.0150  -0.0013  -0.0112  0.011    -0.0027  -0.0019  0.0039  0.0090 
  0.0037*  0.0037  0.0037*  0.0037*    (0.0006)**  (0.0006)  (0.0006)**  (0.0006)** 
  0.0028***  0.0028  0.0028**  0.0028**    [0.0011]*  [0.0011]  [0.0011]**  [0.0011]*** 
Notes : All specifications include a dummy for TREAT, a dummy for ELEG, time dummies, region fixed-effects, region time-varying controls and firm time-varying controls. Robust standard errors 
clustered on treatment (eligibility, control) status are in parenthesis below coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors cluster on treatment (eligibility, control) status-post interactions are in square 
brackets below coefficient estimates. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. The treated sample includes 634 firms. The eligible sample selected by propensity score (exact matching) 
includes 620 (623) firms. The non-eligible sample selected by propensity score (exact matching) includes 633 (641)  firms.. See Table A.1, Table A2, and equation (3) for further details. 
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Table 4 
EFFECT OF PROGRAMME ELIGIBILITY ON INVESTMENT 
UNBALANCED PANEL 
     
  (1)  (2) 
     
  Panel A. Dependent variable: I/K 
POST × TREAT  0.6511  0.6868 
  (0.0225)***  (0.0490)** 
  [0.0189]***  [0.0404]*** 
POST × ELEG  -0.0353  0.0097 
  (0.0106)*  (0.0503) 
  [0.0106]**  [0.0388] 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: I/S 
POST × TREAT  0.0615  0.0531 
  (0.0029)**  (0.0011)*** 
  [0.0021]***  [0.0027]*** 
POST × ELEG  0.0006  -0.0102 
  (0.0007)  (0.0022)** 
  [0.0014]  [0.0052] 
  Panel C. Dependent variable: I/A 
POST × TREAT  0.0807  0.0823 
  (0.0029)**  (0.0092)** 
  [0.0024]***  [0.0063]*** 
POST × ELEG  -0.0057  -0.0039 
  (0.0007)**  (0.0094) 
  [0.0011]**  [0.0078] 
Region time-varying controls  NO  YES 
Notes: All specifications include a dummy for TREAT, a dummy for ELEG, a dummy for POST, region fixed-effects and firm time-
varying  controls.  Robust  standard  errors  clustered  on  treatment  (eligibility,  control)  status  are  in  parenthesis  below  coefficient 
estimates, and robust standard errors cluster on treatment (eligibility, control) status-post interactions are in square brackets below 
coefficient estimates. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. The treated sample includes 993 firms. The 
eligible  sample  includes  962  firms  selected  by  exact  matching.  The  non-eligible  sample  includes  988  firms  selected  by  exact 
matching. See Table A.3 and equation (2) for further details.   26 
Table 5 
EFFECT OF PROGRAMME ELIGIBILITY ON INVESTMENT 
FIRMS WITH THE SAME PATTERN OF PRE-INTERVENTION INVESTMENT GROWTH RATE 
     
  (1)  (2) 
     
  Panel A. Dependent variable: I/K 
POST × TREAT  1.1310  1.0986 
  (0.0071)***  (0.0503)*** 
  [0.0106]***  [0.0425]*** 
POST × ELEG  0.4685  0.4309 
  (0.0099)***  (0.0432)*** 
  [0.0099]***  [0.0360]*** 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: I/S 
POST × TREAT  0.0178  0.1055 
  (0.0014)***  (0.0039)*** 
  [0.0016]***  [0.0042]*** 
POST × ELEG  0.0416  0.0399 
  (0.0005)***  (0.0032)*** 
  [0.0008]***  [0.0053]*** 
  Panel C. Dependent variable: I/A 
POST × TREAT  0.1327  0.1321 
  (0.0016)***  (0.0034)*** 
  [0.0018]***  [0.0023]*** 
POST × ELEG  0.0451  0.0449 
  (0.0010)***  (0.0020)*** 
  [0.0013]***  [0.0029]*** 
Region time-varying controls  NO  YES 
Notes: All specifications include a dummy for TREAT, a dummy for ELEG, a dummy for POST, region fixed-effects and 
firm time-varying controls. Robust standard errors clustered on treatment (eligibility, control) status are in parenthesis 
below coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors cluster on treatment (eligibility, control) status-post interactions 
are in square brackets below coefficient estimates. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. The treated 
sample includes 484 firms. The eligible sample includes 474 firms selected by exact matching. The non-eligible sample 
includes 483 firms selected by exact matching. See Table A.4 and equation (2) for further details.   27 
Table 6 
EFFECT OF PROGRAMME ELIGIBILITY ON INVESTMENT 
COMPARISON GROUPS LOCATED IN CENTRE AND NORTH ITALY AND ABRUZZO 
   
   
  Panel A. Dependent variable: I/K 
POST × TREAT  0.7101 
  (0.2642) 
  [0.2015]*** 
POST × ELEG  -0.6119 
  (0.1363)** 
  [0.0877]*** 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: I/S 
POST × TREAT  0.1534 
  (0.0332)** 
  [0.0248]** 
POST × ELEG  -0.0667 
  (00084)** 
  [0.0074]*** 
  Panel C. Dependent variable: I/A 
POST × TREAT  0.1784 
  (0.0361)** 
  [0.0275]*** 
POST × ELEG  -0.0318 
  (0.0093)* 
  [0.0073]** 
Notes:  All specifications include a dummy  for  TREAT, a  dummy  for POST, region fixed-
effects, region time-varying controls, and firm time-varying controls. Robust standard errors 
clustered  on  treatment  (control)  status  are  in  parenthesis  below  coefficient  estimates,  and 
robust standard errors cluster on treatment (control) status-post interactions are in square 
brackets below coefficient estimates. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
The treated sample includes 76 firms located in the Centre and North of Italy and Abruzzo. 
The eligible sample includes 76 firms located in the eligible areas of Centre and North of Italy 
and Abruzzo selected by exact matching. The control sample includes 75 non-eligible firms 
located in the non-eligible areas of the Centre and North of Italy selected by exact matching. 
See Table A.5 and equation (2) for further details. 
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Table 7 
EFFECT OF THE PROGRAMME PARTICIPATION ON INVESTMENT 
COMPARISON GROUP MADE UP OF LAW 488 REJECTED APPLICANTS 
   
   
  Panel A. Dependent variable: I/K 
POST × TREAT  5.5747 
  (0.6265)* 
  [0.3654]*** 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: I/S 
POST × TREAT  1.4495 
  (0.5872) 
  [0.4364]** 
  Panel C. Dependent variable: I/A 
POST × TREAT  0.1392 
  (0.0056)** 
  [0.0038]*** 
Notes:  All specifications include a dummy  for  TREAT, a  dummy  for POST, region fixed-
effects, region time-varying controls, and firm time-varying controls. Robust standard errors 
clustered  on  treatment  (control)  status  are  in  parenthesis  below  coefficient  estimates,  and 
robust standard errors cluster on treatment (control) status-post interactions are in square 
brackets below coefficient estimates. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
The treated sample includes 354 firms. The control sample includes 354 firms selected by 
exact matching among the Law 488 rejected applicants. See Table A.6 and equation (1) for 
further details.  
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Table 8 
EFFECT OF THE PROGRAMME PARTICIPATION ON INVESTMENT 
REGIONAL INTENSITY OF TREATMENT 
   
   
  Panel A. Dependent variable: I/K 
POST × TREAT × LOW  -0.1571 
  (0.1283) 
  [0.1077) 
POST × TREAT × HIGH  1.1732 
  (0.0123)*** 
  [0.0139]*** 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: I/S 
POST × TREAT × LOW  -0.0185 
  (0.0095) 
  [0.0085]* 
POST × TREAT × HIGH  0.1847 
  (0.0006)*** 
  [0.0006]*** 
  Panel C. Dependent variable: I/A 
POST × TREAT × LOW  -0.0655 
  (0.0165)** 
  [0.0127]*** 
POST × TREAT × HIGH  0.1545 
  (0.0011)*** 
  [0.0009]*** 
Notes:  All  specifications  include  a  dummy  for  TREAT,  a  dummy  for  POST,  dummies  for  the  regional 
intensity of aid, interactions between the dummies for the regional intensity of aid and TREAT, interactions 
between the dummies for the regional intensity of aid and POST, interaction between TREAT and POST, 
region fixed effects, region time-varying controls and firm time-varying controls. Robust standard errors 
clustered on treatment (control) status-post interactions are in parenthesis below coefficient estimates, and 
robust standard errors cluster on treatment (control) status-regional intensity of aid-post interactions are in 
square brackets below coefficient estimates. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. (1). The 
treated sample includes 634 firms. The control sample includes 623 eligible firms selected by exact matching.  
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Table 9 
 SIDE-EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE  
   
  Panel A. Dependent variable: ROA 
POST × TREAT  0.0025 
  (0.0021) 
  [0.0014] 
POST × ELEG  -0.0246 
  (0.0022)** 
  [0.0014]*** 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: labour 
cost/value added 
POST × TREAT  -0.0419 
  (0.1208) 
  [0.0839] 
POST × ELEG  0.3275 
  (0.1291) 
  [0.0902]** 
  Panel C. Dependent variable: debt/assets 
POST × TREAT  -0.0453 
  (0.0048)** 
  [0.0031]*** 
POST × ELEG  -0.0180 
  (0.0049)* 
  [0.0031]** 
  Panel D. Dependent variable: interest 
cost/debt 
POST × TREAT  0.0044 
  (0.0004)** 
  [0.0009]** 
POST × ELEG  0.0014 
  (0.0004)* 
  [0.0009] 
Notes: All specifications include a dummy for Treat, a dummy for Post, region fixed-effects, 
region  time-varying  controls,  and  firm  time-varying  controls.  Robust  standard  errors 
clustered  on  treatment  (control)  status  are  in  parenthesis  below  coefficient  estimates,  and 
robust standard errors clustered on treatment (control) status-post interactions are in square 
brackets below coefficient estimates. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
The treated sample includes 634 firms. The eligible sample includes 623 firms selected by 
exact matching. The non-eligible sample includes and 641 firms selected by exact matching.. 
See Table A.2 and equation (2) for further details. 
 
 Table A1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR THE EXPERIMENT OF TABLES 1 AND 3 
  Mean and standard deviation  Mean differences 






             
Investments/capital  0.9852  0.9151  1.0596  0.0701  -0.0743  -0.1444 
  (2.4810)  (2.4684)  (2.8533)  0.1396)  (0.1499)  (0.1508) 
Investment/sales  0.0787  0.0746  0.0651  0.0041  0.0137  0.0095 
  (0.2894)  (0.3122)  (0.2333)  (0.0169)  (0.0147)  (0.0155) 
Investment/assets  0.0883  0.070  0.0744  0.0181  0.0139  -0.0042 
  (0.3021)  (0.2703)  (0.2331)  (0.0161)  (0.0151)  (0.0142) 
Sales  2349.50  1868.79  2374.22  480.70  -24.716  -505.42 
  (5087.09)  (425.59)  (6259.63)  (265.10)*  (319.84)  (303.22)* 
Cash flow/assets  0.0799  0.0813  0.0808  -0.0013  -0.0008  0.0004 
  (0.0804)  (0.0932)  (0.0830)  (0.0049)  (0.0045)  (0.0049) 
Interest cost/debt  0.0265  0.0262  0.0258  0.0013  0.0007  0.0003 
  (0.0245)  (0.0248)  (0.0213)  (0.0013)  (0.0012)  (0.0013) 
GOM/value added  0.3371  0.3749  0.4622  -0.0377  -0.1250  -0.0872 
  (1.2420)  (1.3712)  (0.5534)  (0.0737)  (0.0540)**  (0.0588) 
Debt/assets  0.7445  0.7363  0.7241  0.0082  0.0204  0.0122 
  (0.2146)  (0.2474)  (0.2063)  (0.0130)  (0.0118)*  (0.0128) 
ROA  0.0221  0.0216  0.0252  0.000  -0.0031  -0.0036 
  (0.0729)  (0.0802)  (0.0726)  (0.0043)  (0.0041)  (0.0043) 
Notes: The TREAT sample includes 638 firms. The ELEG sample includes 620 firms selected by propensity score (nearest neighbour 
matching). The NELE sample includes 633 firms selected by propensity score (nearest neighbour matching). Standard deviations in 







DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR THE EXPERIMENT OF TABLES 2 AND 3 
  Mean and standard deviation  Mean differences 






             
Investment/capital  1.0640  0.9895  0.9995  0.0745  0.0645  -0.0099 
  (2.7281)  (2.6050)  (2.5431)  (0.1505)  (0.1476)  (0.1448) 
Investment/sales  0.0828  0.0754  0.0637  0.0074  0.0191  0.0116 
  (0.2872)  (0.2780)  (0.2663)  (0.0159)  (0.0155)  (0.0153) 
Investment/assets  0.0915  0.0880  0.0769  0.0034  0.0145  0.0110 
  (0.3024)  (0.2758)  (0.2826)  (0.0163)  (0.0163)  (0.0157) 
Sales  2364.875  2197.518  2314.376  167.3564  50.4988  -116.8575 
  (5100.268)  (4638.192)  (4964.266)  (275.1108)  (281.8724)  (270.404) 
Cash flow/assets  0.0791  0.0761  0.0789  0.0030  0.0001  -0.0028 
  (0.0796)  (0.0749)  (0.0817)  (0.0043)  (0.0045)  (0.0044) 
Interest cost/debt  0.0265  0.0298  0.0298  -0.0032  -0.0033  -0.00007 
  (0.0245)  (0.0249)  (0.0257)  (0.0013)**  (0.0014)**  (0.0014) 
GOM/value added  0.3372  0.4733  0.4391  -0.1360  -0.1018  0.0342 
  (1.2457)  (1.6444)  (0.7231)  (0.0822)*  (0.0569)*  (0.0711) 
Debt/assets  0.7469  0.7536  0.7333  -0.0066  0.0135  0.0202 
  (0.2127)  (0.1989)  (0.2099)  (0.0116)  (0.0118)  (0.0115)* 
ROA  0.0222  0.0202  0.0164  0.0020  0.0057  0.0037 
  (0.0720)  (0.0606)  (0.0685)  (0.0037)  (0.0039)  (0.0036) 
Notes: The TREAT sample includes 634 firms. The ELEG sample includes 623 firms selected by exact matching. The NELE sample 
includes 641 firms selected by exact matching. Standard deviations in parenthesis below means. Standard errors of the mean differences 
in square brackets. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
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Table A3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR THE EXPERIMENT OF TABLES 4 
  Mean and standard deviation  Mean differences 






             
Investments/capital  1.2236  1.0407  1.0199  0.1829  0.2037  0.0207 
  (3.0564)  (2.9534)  (2.8213)  (0.1359)  (0.1321)  (0.1307) 
Investment/sales  0.1353  0.1032  0.0979  0.0320  0.0374  0.0053 
  (0.4631)  (0.4207)  (0.4234)  (0.0200)  (0.0199)*  (0.0191) 
Investment/assets  0.1218  0.0886  0.0691  0.0332  0.0526  0.0194 
  (0.4344)  (0.3650)  (0.2094)  (0.0181)*  (0.0153)***  (0.0134) 
Sales  2255.899  1860.85  2340.582  395.049  -84.683  -479.732 
  (6304.773)  (5351.643)  (5433.429)  (264.882)  (264.505)  (244.248)** 
Cash flow/assets  0.0817  0.0733  0.0731  0.0084  0.0085  0.0001 
  (0.0825)  (0.0732)  (0.0750)  (0.0035)**  (0.0036)**  (0.0033) 
Interest cost/debt  0.0246  0.0238  0.0249  0.0007  -0.0003  -0.0010 
  (0.0231)  (0.0214)  (0.0213)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0009) 
GOM/value added  0.3977  0.4371  0.4055  -0.0394  -0.0077  0.0316 
  (1.5192)  (0.9489)  (1.9158)  (0.0574)  (0.0776)  (0.0687) 
Debt/assets  0.7561  0.7511  0.7463  0.0050  0.0098  0.0048 
  (0.2055)  (0.2114)  (0.2113)  (0.0094)  (0.0093)  (0.0095) 
ROA  0.0249  0.0229  0.0223  0.0019  0.0026  0.0006 
  (0.0708)  (0.0603)  (0.0667)  (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0028) 
Notes: The TREAT sample includes 993 firms. The ELEG sample includes 962 firms selected by propensity score (nearest neighbour 
matching). The NELE sample includes 988 firms selected by propensity score (nearest neighbour matching). Standard deviations in 





DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR THE EXPERIMENT OF TABLES 5 
  Mean and standard deviation  Mean differences 






             
Investments/capital  0.7373  0.5628  0.6989  0.1745  0.0384  -0.1360 
  (2.0227)  (1.7728)  (2.0365)  (0.1229)  (0.1305)  (0.1235) 
Investment/sales  0.0444  0.0224  0.0300  0.0220  0.0143  -0.0076 
  (0.1643)  (0.1417)  (0.1265)  (0.0099)**  (0.0094)  (0.0086) 
Investment/assets  0.0585  0.0318  0.0502  0.0267  0.0083  -0.0184 
  (0.1951)  (0.1360)  (0.1776)  (0.0108)**  (0.0120)  (0.0102)* 
Sales  2703.03  2462.65  2744.90  240.37  -41.87  -282.24 
  (5722.82)  (5196.27)  (5720.58)  (353.38)  (367.99)  (353.47) 
Cash flow/assets  0.0806  0.0745  0.0789  0.0060  0.0016  -0.0043 
  (0.0821)  (0.0736)  (0.0796)  (0.0050)  (0.0052)  (0.0049) 
Interest cost/debt  0.3493  0.0293  0.0311  -0.0011  -0.0029  -0.0018 
  (0.0258)  (0.0249)  (0.0262)  (0.0016)  (0.0016)*  (0.0016) 
Gross operating margin  0.3493  0.4178  0.4879  -0.0685  -0.1386  -0.0700 
  (1.3887)  (0.5482)  (1.2047)  (0.0684)  (0.0836)*  (0.0606) 
Debt/assets  0.7269  0.7343  0.7283  -0.0073  -0.0013  0.0060 
  (0.2217)  (0.2167)  (0.2200)  (0.0142)  (0.0142)  (0.0141) 
ROA  0.0248  0.0214  0.0205  0.0033  0.0043  0.0009 
  (0.0746)  (0.0577)  (0.0655)  (0.0043)  (0.0045)  (0.0039) 
Notes: The TREAT sample includes 484 firms. The ELEG sample includes 474 firms selected by exact matching. The NELE sample 
includes 483 firms selected by exact matching. Standard deviations in parenthesis below means. Standard errors of the mean differences 
in square brackets. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.   33 
Table A5 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR THE EXPERIMENT OF TABLE  6 
  Mean and standard deviation  Mean differences 






             
Investment/capital  1.7190  0.7905  1.1788  0.9284  0.5402  -0.3882 
  (6.5861)  (3.0625)  (3.3271)  (0.8331)  (0.8509)  (0.5202) 
Investment/sales  0.0527  0.0664  0.1008  -0.0137  -0.0481  -0.0344 
  (0.1463)  (0.2807)  (0.2594)  (0.0363)  (0.0342)  (0.0440) 
Investment/assets  0.0768  0.0864  0.1141  -0.0095  -0.0373  -0.0277 
  (0.1914)  (0.3642)  (0.3069)  (0.0472)  (0.0415)  0.0548 
Sales  17725.48  12311.36  15868.56  5414.118  1856.918  -3557.200 
  (52188.42)  (42564.25)  (45876.98)  (7724.99)  (8000.575)  (7200.641) 
Cash flow/assets  0.0876  0.0825  0.0746  0.0050  0.0129  0.0078 
  (0.0634)  (0.0724)  (0.0757)  (0.0110)  (0.0113)  (0.0120) 
Interest cost/debt  0.0336  0.0294  0.0301  0.0042  0.0035  -0.0007 
  (0.0322)  (0.0256)  (0.0186)  (0.0047)  (0.0043)  (0.0036) 
GOM/value added  0.0279  0.4323  0.4900  -0.4043  -0.4620  -0.0577 
  (2.9533)  (0.2953)  (0.7973)  (0.3404)  0.3530  (0.0976) 
Debt/assets  0.6950  0.7077  0.7257  -0.0126  -0.0306  -0.0179 
  (0.1978)  (0.2152)  (0.2402)  (0.0335)  (0.0357)  (0.0371) 
ROA  0.0190  0.0147  0.0124  0.0042  0.0065  0.0023 
  (0.0417)  (0.0533)  (0.0470)  (0.0077)  (0.0072)  (0.0081) 
Notes: The TREAT sample includes 76 firms located in the Centre and North of Italy and Abruzzo. The ELEG sample includes 76 firms 
located in the eligible areas of the Centre and North of Italy and Abruzzo selected by exact matching. The NELE sample includes 75 
firms located in the non-eligible areas of the Centre and North of Italy selected by exact matching. Standard deviations in parenthesis 






DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR THE EXPERIMENT OF TABLE 7 
  Mean and standard deviation 
  TREAT  LAW 488 REJECTED 
FIRMS 
Mean differences 
       
Investment/capital  2.2097  4.6320  -2.4222 
  (11.8534)  (36.7959)  (2.0546) 
Investment/sales  1.9835  3.1287  -1.1451 
  (34.6561)  (28.4265)  (2.3823) 
Investment/assets  0.1092  0.2590  -0.1497 
  (0.3426)  (0.6895)  (0.0405)*** 
Sales  3361.718  2106.782  1254.797 
  (14295.1)  (1630.385)  (797.9789) 
Cash flow/assets  0.0793  0.0764  0.0028 
  (0.0723)  (0.1073)  (0.0068) 
Interest cost/debt  0.0247  0.0300  -0.0053 
  (0.0201)  (0.0207)  (0.0015)*** 
GOM/value added  0.3247  0.4403  -0.1156 
  (0.2469)  (1.6787)  (0.0901) 
Debt/assets  0.7337  0.6720  0.0616 
  (0.2097)  (0.2196)  (0.0161)*** 
ROA  0.0212  0.0147  0.0064 
  (0.0594)  0.1083  (0.0065) 
Notes: The TREAT sample includes 354 firms. The control sample includes 354 Law 488 rejected applicants. Standard deviations in 
parenthesis below means. Standard errors of the mean differences in square brackets. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) 
[10%] level.   34 
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